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We analyze contagious sovereign debt crises in financially integrated economies. Under financial integration
banks optimally diversify their holdings of sovereign debt in an effort to minimize the costs with respect
to an individual country's sovereign debt default. While diversification generates risk diversification
benefits ex ante, it also generates contagion ex post. We show that financial integration without fiscal
integration results in an inefficient equilibrium supply of government debt. The safest governments
inefficiently restrict the amount of high quality debt that could be used as collateral in the financial
system and the riskiest governments issue too much debt, as they do not take account of the costs of
contagion. Those inefficiencies can be removed by various forms of fiscal integration, but fiscal integration















This paper considers government debt management, sovereign default risk, and the impli-
cations of sovereign debt crises for the banking sector in nancially integrated economies.
The recent literature on sovereign debt has generally abstracted from the link between a
sovereign debt crisis in a country and contagion to other countries through an integrated
banking system. But, as the recent European sovereign debt crisis has highlighted, contagion
of the crisis in one country to other countries through the banking system can be a major
issue.1 When the safety of a country's government debt starts being questioned, problems
quickly spill over to the nancial system and, given the high degree of international nancial
integration, to other countries.
A rst question we address is, what determines bank portfolios of sovereign debt? Why
do banks hold sovereign bonds and why do they diversify their government debt holdings?
A second, closely related question, is how government debt management policies are aected
by banks' demand for government bonds? Given that there is a risk of contagion of a
crisis through an integrated banking system, a third question is how countries that are
potentially aected by the crisis deal with the costly scal adjustments that may be necessary
to forestall it? This latter question, in particular, has been at the core of the European
crisis, and underlies the debates around the European Financial Stabilization Fund that has
been set up to deal with the Greek, Irish, and possibly other European Union `peripheral'
member-country sovereign debt crises. Finally, given the potential contagion risk and scal
adjustment costs that may come with greater nancial integration, a fourth question is
whether these risks and costs may eliminate the benets of greater integration altogether?
Banks hold government debt for several dierent reasons. In developing countries most
1The fact that banks are exposed to the risk of default on government debt, including foreign government
debt, has been observed in previous crises. This was true in the debt crises of the 1980s (where advanced-
country banks were hit by sovereign defaults, mostly in Latin America) and in the crises of the 1990s (e.g.
Mexico, Russia, Argentina). The form of the contagion across countries has changed, however, as government
debt increasingly took the form of bonds that could be held by non-bank investors. Also, the fact that bonds
were continuously traded and priced in secondary markets has accelerated contagion, even if the risk could
be more evenly spread between bank and non-bank investors.
2government debt is held by banks. This has been attributed to the underdeveloped nature
of nancial systems in these countries (see e.g. Kumhof and Tanner, 2008). However,
in advanced economies banks also hold a substantial fraction of their assets in the form
of government bonds, mostly for risk and liquidity-management purposes. One reason, in
particular, why banks hold government and other AAA-rated bonds is that they may serve
as collateral for interbank loans or repos. This is the reason we emphasize in our model.
Another important reason why banks hold government bonds is accesss to public liquidity,
as central banks generally require collateral in the form of government and other highly
rated securities in return for cheap lending to banks through the discount window. This
latter reason may have played a particularly important role in the Euro zone and may
explain why there has been substantially faster nancial integration among Euro member
countries than elsewhere, as De Santis and Gerard (2006) have highlighted. To the extent
that monetary union brings about a greater nancial integration, the analysis in this paper
is particularly pertinent for the unfolding European debt crisis. However, it is also more
widely relevant given that many central banks around the world accept foreign government
bonds as collateral, and given that foreign bonds can be used as collateral in repo markets.
A rst innovation of the sovereign debt model we propose is, thus, to introduce a role for
government debt securities as collateral for interbank loans. In our model, the safer is the
government debt held by the banking sector as collateral, the more investments the banking
system as a whole can originate and therefore the higher will be the country's output. With
a higher output in turn, it is easier for the government to be able to service its debt with tax
revenues. Our model is set up to capture in very simple terms a key feedback loop faced by
governments in the recent European sovereign debt crises: a loss of credibility in government
debt almost inevitably has the eect of reducing investment and output growth, thereby
reducing the tax base available to service the debt. This feedback operates through the
banking system in our model, but in practice it could also operate through other channels,
such as reduced household wealth, condence, and consumption, and therefore also reduced
3investment and overall economic activity.
Another innovation that we introduce into the model is nancial integration. We consider
a set of countries, where possibly as a result of a monetary union, the government debt of
each country can be readily used as collateral in the nancial system of all the countries, just
as Italian debt for example can be used as collateral by a German bank in the Euro zone.
This naturally leads to nancial integration, as banks in each country will want to hold debt
instruments from several dierent government issuers as a way of diversifying their risk with
respect to sovereign debt default. Indeed, we show that international nancial integration
can thereby bring important benets and enhance economic activity in the union. However,
this diversication benet also gives rise to greater systemic risk, as a sovereign debt crisis
in one country may now more easily spread to other countries. Contagion risk depends, of
course, on how prudently member-country governments manage their debt. Under nancial
integration, each country is responsible for preserving the safety of the entire nancial system.
By prudently managing its indebtedness each country provides a public good to all the other
countries that are part of the system. Whether countries will eciently provide this public
good is far from obvious.
Indeed, we show that individual incentives of member countries are to supply an exces-
sively low amount of safe debt and an excessively high amount of risky debt from the point
of view of the integrated nancial system as a whole. On the one hand, a country that issues
safe debt may derive a rent from being the monopolistic supplier of the \safe haven" asset
and may choose to exploit its monopoly power by supplying an excessively low level of safe
debt. On the other hand, countries have insucient incentives to keep their outstanding
debt safe because they do not internalize the costs to other member countries in terms of
greater nancial fragility.
Interestingly, these incentives are present even when there is no bailout of the country
facing a sovereign debt crisis. Thus, our analysis points to the importance of scal integration
following nancial (and monetary) integration even when a monetary union can commit
4not to bail out a member country. If such a commitment is not possible, as the recent
European crisis has highlighted, then a fortiori there is an even stronger argument for
scal integration. We also show that the benets of economic integration are unevenly
distributed across member-countries. Financial and scal integration are generally seen to
benet primarily the countries that would otherwise nd it dicult to produce good collateral
for their banking systems. However in our model, nancial integration actually increases the
welfare of the country that provides a \safe haven" asset to other economies, and only the
combination of nancial and scal integration generally reduces the welfare of the \safe
haven" country relative to the equilibrium with no integration at all.
With the exception of a few recent papers, the sovereign debt literature has not considered
the issue of spillovers of a sovereign debt crisis to a banking crisis (and vice-versa), nor the
issue of contagion of one sovereign debt crisis to other countries. It is typically assumed in
this literature that all the sovereign debt is held by foreign (non-bank) creditors (see e.g.
Obstfeld and Rogo, 1996). Following the Asia, Russia, and Argentina crises much of the
sovereign debt literature has focused on the issue of crisis resolution, bailouts, and debt
restructuring (see e.g. Bolton and Jeanne, 2007, 2009, and Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer,
2006). While this literature contains important lessons for the resolution of the European
debt crisis (for instance the proposal for a restructuring procedure of the Greek debt by
Buchheit and Gulati, 2010), it cannot deal with the issues related to nancial integration,
bank fragility, and contagion that have been at the core of the crisis.
There is only a handful of recent papers that address the interaction between sovereign
default and the stability of the domestic nancial system. Most closely related to our analysis
is the paper by Gennaioli, Martin and Rossi (2010), who also consider a model where public
default weakens the balance sheet of banks who hold public bonds, causing a decline in
private credit. As in Broner, Martin and Ventura (2010), they and we assume that sovereign
debt is traded between residents and nonresidents in secondary markets, which prevents
selective defaults on foreign creditors. They highlight two empirical facts that are consistent
5with their model (and ours): i) public defaults are followed by large contractions in private
credit, and ii) these contractions are more severe in countries where banks hold more public
debt. One important dierence with our model is their focus on a small open economy,
while the heart of our analysis is the international spillovers between nancially integrated
economies.
Broner and Ventura (2010) also consider a model of international nancial integration and
show that it may reduce domestic incentives to enforce private contracts|including domestic
contracts|which, in turn, may lead to a decrease in welfare. In our model, international
nancial integration may also reduce welfare, but through a dierent channel: it does not
directly aect the enforcement of private contracts, but it gives rise to contagion of sovereign
debt crises, as foreign debt is used as collateral in lending between domestic banks. Sandleris
(2010) presents a model in which a government default induces a credit crunch in the domestic
private sector by sending a bad signal about future fundamentals. A common theme running
through these papers is that integration between domestic and international nance helps the
sovereign to credibly commit to repay its foreign creditors, but may contribute to weakening
the domestic nancial system. Finally, Reinhart and Rogo (2009) present evidence on the
relationship between government debt crises and banking crises, which is consistent with the
predictions of our model in terms of equilibrium bailouts to prevent a contagious debt crisis.
Our model of the costs and benets of joining a monetary union is also related to the
literature on the breakup of nations (see Alesina and Spolaore, 1997 and 2005, and Bolton and
Roland, 1996 and 1997). This literature focuses on non-nancial variables such as the greater
heterogeneity of preferences in larger nations making it more dicult to provide public goods
under majority voting, or regional wealth inequalities and inter-regional transfers making
it harder to maintain political support for a union in the wealthier regions. While these
non-nancial variables have played a major role in Europe, our analysis in this paper adds
the important monetary and nancial dimensions to this issue. In particular, our analysis
highlights that wealthier countries may resist greater scal integration not only for fear of
6the scal transfers to poorer regions but also for fear of losing the rents obtained from the
supply of scarce safe haven assets.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews the main facts that are
relevant to our analysis. The following section presents the basic assumptions of our model
in a closed economy. Section 4 presents the model with two nancially-integrated economies.
Section 5 studies scal integration and section 6 presents extensions of the model. Finally,
section 7 concludes.
2 Facts
We review in this section some stylized facts that motivate the theoretical analysis presented
in the rest of the paper. We start with a presentation of the European government debt crisis,
before moving on to a more systematic examination of the exposure of advanced economy
banks to domestic and foreign government debt.
2.1 The 2010 European government debt crisis
Sovereign spreads in Europe widened in the Fall of 2008 in the wake of the Lehman crisis (Fig-
ure 1). The discrimination among sovereign issuers may have initially re
ected the relative
liquidity of dierent government bond markets, with a 
ight to the safety and liquidity that
could be found in the most liquid sovereign bond markets { such as the benchmark Bunds
(Sgherri and Zoli, 2009). However, the attention of investors quickly turned to country-
specic solvency concerns, with a clear link being made between government debt risk and
weaknesses in the banking sector (Mody, 2009; Ejsing and Lemke, 2009). In Ireland, for
example, sovereign spreads started to increase after the government extended a guarantee
to Irish banks. But the causality between bank fragility and government debt fragility was
going both ways: investors could also see that increased sovereign risk would have a negative
impact on the banks that were holding government debt.
7Figure 1: CDS spreads in Europe
The European sovereign debt worries started to turn into a full-
edged crisis in November
2009, when the new Greek government revealed that the scal decit was twice as large as
previously believed. As can be seen from the CDS spread data reported in Figure 1, the Greek
CDS spread increased rapidly to more than 4 percent in early 2010, re
ecting a signicant
increase in market expectations of a Greek default or debt restructuring. But until March
2010, there was relatively little contagion to other European economies|it was still believed
by many at the time that the impact of a Greek credit event could be contained as Greek
debt amounted to a small fraction of total euro government debt.
However, it became increasingly apparent in March that, as the European economic
recovery was weak, the scal austerity measures adopted in Greece were not reassuring
investors, and the crisis was starting to spill over to other European countries. The main
concern was that a Greek default would lead investors to lose condence in other euro area
countries with less severe but similar debt and decit problems, such as Portugal and Ireland,
and perhaps even to larger countries such as Italy or Spain. If the crisis were allowed to
spill over to a large fraction of euro area government debt, it could then engulf the whole
8euro area banking system, including the banks of countries, such as Germany or France,
where government debt itself was not perceived to be a problem. Another concern was that
a downgrading of the riskiest government debts by rating agencies would destabilize the euro
interbank lending market as such debts would no longer be acceptable as collateral by the
European Central Bank (ECB).
In March, EU countries announced that they were setting up|together with the IMF|
a crisis lending mechanism for Greece or other countries that might need it. The eect of
this announcement on market condence, however, was limited by several factors, includ-
ing Germany's perceived reluctance to rescue Greece, and the insucient size of the funds
committed to the mechanism if countries other than Greece had to be helped.
The crisis entered its most acute phase at the end of April. After Greece posted a
worse than expected budget decit, market participants started to worry that the Greek
government would be able to roll over a relatively large amount of debt coming due in May
if a rescue package was not quickly put in place. On 23 April 2010, the Greek government
requested that the EU/IMF crisis lending mechanism be activated. On April 27 the Greek
debt rating was downgraded to junk status by Standard & Poor's, making the Greek debt
government ineligible as collateral with the ECB. Portugal's simultaneous downgrade and
Spain's subsequent one added to the negative sentiment. CDS spreads Greek debt rose to
more than 900 basis points, a level that was seen before only in emerging market or developing
economies. European equity markets fell, and the euro depreciated against major currencies.
Soon, the impact spread beyond Europe, causing a sell-o in global equity markets. The
crisis spilled over into interbank money markets, reviving the same concerns about rising
counterparty risk as in the Fall of 2008. \This is like Ebola," declared the OECD Secretary
General Angel Gurria on April 28, adding that the Greek crisis was \contaminating all the
spreads and distorting all the risk-assessment measures."
Gripped by a sense of urgency, the European authorities reacted with a number of far-
reaching measures. Early May 2010, a crisis loan agreement was reached with Greece for a
9total of e110 bn, enough to cover Greece's funding need until 2012. The European Central
Bank modied its rules and declared that Greek bonds would remain eligible as collateral
even with junk status, before announcing a policy of supporting the price of certain govern-
ment debts through open market purchases.2 A new entity, the European Financial Stability
Facility (EFSF), was created to grant conditional crisis loans to euro area governments af-
fected by contagion from the Greek crisis.3 The EFSF was endowed with enough resources
to cover the budget nancing needs of Greece over 2009-2012 (Blundell-Wignall and Slovik,
2010).
Asset price movements immediately following these announcements initially suggested
that the contagion from the Greek crisis was abating. Euro sovereign credit spreads narrowed
and the euro appreciated. The relief in markets turned out to be temporary, however, as
investors continued to worry about the mutually-reinforcing negative interactions between
scal retrenchment, banking problems and economic recession. In June, EU government
leaders, inspired by the earlier success of the US stress test, sought to dispel the worst fears
of investors about the health of European banks by announcing the publication of the results
of a stress test covering 91 banks. The main focus of the stress test was the exposure of
banks to government debt. The results of the stress test released in July showed that all
banks passed the test except for seven (ve in Spain, one in Greece and one in Germany),
which were asked to raise new capital.4
It is too early to tell whether the measures taken by the European authorities last May
2The member banks of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) would start buying government
debt in \those market segments which are dysfunctional."The ESCB's decision was motivated by the belief
that the price of certain government debts had reached levels that were abnormally low, given the com-
mitment of those governments to scal adjustment. The reasons for this alleged mispricing were not made
explicit.
3The EFSF was endowed with e 750 bn of resources. The EFSF can issue up to e 440 billion of debt on
the market to raise the funds needed to provide loans to crisis countries in the euro area. These resources
are augmented by e 60 billion coming from the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM), i.e.
funds raised by the European Commission, and up to e 250 billion from the International Monetary Fund
(IMF). The EFSF should access markets only after a euro member has submitted a request for support. The
rst EFSF bonds were issued in January 2011 as part of the EU/IMF nancial support package for Ireland.
4In order to pass the stress test a bank needed to have a Tier 1 capital ratio in excess of 6 percent, in
line with the benchmark used in the US stress test.
10set the stage for a successful resolution of the European government debt problems. The
spread on the Greek debt remains elevated, and that on the Irish debt increased sharply
at the end of 2010. The Irish crisis diers from the Greek one in that it originated in the
banking sector and spilled over to the debt of the government. After several bailouts of Irish
banks by the Irish government, the Irish banking system had to rely on liquidity provision by
the ECB, while the Irish government was losing access to private markets, with spreads over
German bunds reaching 600 basis points. At the end of November 2010, the Irish government
requested and obtained a e85 bn package from the EU and the IMF.
If there is one clear lesson from the crisis, it is the extent of the economic and nancial
interdependence created by the fact that euro area banks hold euro area government debt.
A consequence of nancial integration is that euro area banks are exposed to the average
risk in euro area government debt, not only to the risk in the debt of their home country
government. This implies|since no government can be indierent to the health of its banking
system|that distressed government debt tends to become a liability for all governments in
a crisis.
Indeed, the measures adopted during the crisis have already resulted in a certain measure
of collectivization of government debts. First, euro area central banks have assumed some
of the sovereign debt risk through their purchase of distressed debt in secondary markets,
a quasi-scal operation that could potentially result in a loss for the taxpayers in all euro
area countries. Second, the EFSF also institutes a certain degree of scal solidarity between
euro area governments. Lenders to the EFSF are protected by credit enhancements, taking
the form of a cash buer and a limited collective guarantee if one member country came
to default.5 This means that a default by one of the EFSF member countries might not
be without a scal cost to the other members. A key point of contention in the design of
the European Stability Mechanism, which should succeed the EFSF in 2013, is the strength
of the safeguards against the collectivization of government debts and the extent of the
5It is partly thanks to those credit enhancements that the EFSF received the top rating from all three
major credit rating agencies in September 2010 .
11reliance on hard scal conditionality. Unsurprisingly, the crisis has also given a new impetus
to proposals to reinforce economic governance in the EU, in particular the oversight of scal
policies.
2.2 Exposure of banks to government debt in advanced economies
The central issue in this paper is the international contagion coming from the fact that banks
are exposed to the sovereign risk of foreign countries. In this section we take a look at the
data to get a sense of the magnitude of this exposure in advanced economies. It is generally
dicult to nd consistent cross-country data on the exposure of banks in a given country to
the government debt of another country, and the richest source of data that we could nd
was the 2010 European stress test. But before we come back to Europe, let us try and look
at this problem from a more global perspective.
Table 1 reports the share of central government debt that is held by domestic banks, and
the share of domestic government debt in bank nancial assets for the US, the euro area
and Japan. The share of government debt in banks' nancial assets might underestimate
the systemic implications of government debt risk to the extent that government debt has a
key function (as collateral) in the interbank lending market. This caveat notwithstanding,
the numbers reported in Table 1 are instructive in several ways.
There seems to be a lot of heterogeneity in the exposure of banks to domestic government
debt. At the end of 2009, US banks invested only about 1 percent of their nancial assets
in federal government debt (about 9 times less than their exposure to Agency- and GSE-
backed securities). The US central government debt was held mostly by the foreign sector,
US households and mutual funds. By contrast, one half of the Japanese central government
debt was held by Japanese banks, and government debt amounted to almost one fourth of
banks' nancial assets. For Europe,6 the table reports the unweighted cross-country average
6The number of 14.9 percent reported for Europe is an underestimate because it does not include the
12of the ratios across 17 countries that had banks covered by the stress test. In terms of the
share of domestic government debt held by domestic banks, Europe seems to be between
Japan and the US.
Table 1. Central Government Debt and Banks (end 2009)
U.S. Europe Japan
Share of government debt held by domestic banks (%) 2.4 14.9 50.0
Share of government debt in domestic bank nancial assets (%) 1.3 na 23.0
Source: Federal Reserve 
ow of funds; BoJ 
ow of funds (banks dened as depository
corporations); European stress test.
We unfortunately do not have good data to assess the exposure of foreign banks to US
or Japanese government debt. According to the US Treasury International Capital (TIC)
database, the share of the outstanding stock of US Treasury securities held by foreign private
investors was 12.6 percent at the end of 2009.7 We do not know how much of this was held
by banks as opposed to non-bank foreign investors, but it is quite possible that a larger share
of US government debt was held by foreign banks than by domestic banks. This is certainly
not the case for Japan: the share of Japanese government debt held by foreigners is about 7
percent, much smaller than the share held by domestic banks.
Whereas it is generally dicult to nd information on cross-border holding of government
debt by banks, the European stress test has produced a wealth of information on this topic.
The stress test covered 91 banks in 18 EU countries, representing 65 percent of the EU
banking sector in terms of total assets.8 Five of those countries are not members of the
banks that were not covered by the stress test. It is a cross-country average of the share of government
debt held by domestic banks and so does not include intra-EU cross-border holdings of government debt by
banks. If we consolidate government debt across Europe, we nd that 26 percent of European government
debt was held by European banks.
7This share is of course much larger (47.3 percent) if one also includes the foreign ocial sector|mainly
foreign central banks that have accumulated US Treasury securities as international reserves.
8The 18 countries whose banking sector is covered by the test are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia,
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Figure 2: Share of government debt held by domestic banks and by foreign banks (%)
euro area (Denmark, Hungary, Poland, Sweden and the United Kingdom). Each bank in the
sample was requested to provide its exposure to the government debt of each EU country at
the end of March 2010. By aggregating the information across the banks of a given country,
we can derive the exposure of any country's banking system to the government debt of any
other country in the sample.9
It will be convenient to introduce some notations in order to characterize the exposure of
banks to domestic and foreign government debt. We denote by bij the holdings of government
debt of country j by the banks of country i (in billions euros). We also denote by dj the
total government debt of country j.
The rst fact that we observe is a signicant share of European government debt is
held by European banks, especially foreign banks. Figure 2 shows the share of government
debt held by domestic banks, bj=dj, and by foreign (European) banks,
P
i6=j bij=dj, for each
country j in our sample. We observe that close to 30 percent of government debt is held by
the banking sector, with signicantly higher shares for the debt of the German and Spanish
9The data are available in excel format at http://www.piie.com/realtime/?p=1711, thanks to Jacob











International diversification: share of  foreign government debt in 
government debt held by banks (%)
Figure 3: Share of foreign debt in government debt held by banks (%)
governments.10 In addition, foreign banks own a larger share of the government's debt than
domestic banks in most countries.
Figure 3 shows a measure of the exposure of European banks to foreign (as opposed to
domestic) sovereign risk. The gure reports, for each country in our sample, the share of
the government debt held by banks that was issued by a foreign government rather than the




j bij, for each country i. The gure shows that in
several countries (Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Slovenia and the UK) banks invested
about 70 percent of their government debt portfolio in the debt of foreign governments. By
contrast, the exposure of Greek banks to foreign sovereign risk was very low (which may
re
ect moral suasion by the Greek authorities), and it was zero in Hungary and Poland,
two countries that have not yet adopted the euro as their currency. However, there is no
clear correlation between euro membership and the international diversication of banks'
government debt portfolios since the share of foreign government debt was high in the three
other non-euro-members (Denmark, Sweden and the UK).
Finally, Figure 4 shows the average composition of banks' foreign debt portfolio and com-
pares it to the outstanding stocks of government debt. We construct a "foreign government
10The shares reported in Figure 2 are likely to be underestimates as they re
ect only the banks included
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Composition of banks' foreign government debt portfolio
Figure 4: Composition of banks' foreign government debt portfolio (%)
debt portfolio" by adding the holdings of foreign government debt across all the banks in
the sample, that is (
P
i;i6=j bij) for each country j in the sample. The share of each country's




i;j;i6=j bij, is represented by the
blue bars. The red bars represent the share of each country's government debt in total
debt, i.e., dj=
P
k dk. We observe that the two measures are very close to each other, i.e.,
the banks' portfolio of foreign government debt tend to re
ect the outstanding stocks. In
particular, the main instrument of international diversication is the Italian debt (more than
the German and French debt) because this debt is in large supply. The countries that are
under-represented in the foreign debt portfolio are the UK (perhaps because of the currency
risk) and to a lesser extent, France.
To summarize, cross-border holdings of government debt by banks have played an im-
portant role in how the European debt crisis developed as well as the policy response of the
authorities. The bank stress test has revealed a very high degree of international integration
between government debt markets and the banking systems of european countries. Financial
integration implies that a government debt crisis in one country tends to spill over to the
16banking system of other countries. Financial integration, in other words, led to nancial
contagion. Eorts to prevent or mitigate contagion, through ESCB interventions or the
creation of new mechanisms such as the EFSF, may have resulted in a certain degree of
collectivization of government debts. This makes sound scal policy a common good, and
may create a force toward scal integration, although it is not yet quite clear what weight
will be put on scal transfers (bailouts) versus scal adjustment. We now turn to a model
than can shed light on these phenomena.
3 One Country
This section presents the main assumptions or our theoretical framework. We will consider
(in section 4) a world with two countries that are perfectly nanciall integrated, and we will
focus on the analysis of cross-country spillovers in government debt and banking risk. For
the sake of expositional clarity, however, this section starts by presenting the assumptions
of our model for the case of a closed economy. This will make the analysis of a two-country
world easier to understand in a second step.
We consider an economy with a single homogenous private consumption good and a
public good. Time in the model is divided into three periods t = 0;1;2. Consumption can
take place in all three periods, but for simplicity investment can only take place once at time
t = 1|and returns on investment are realized once at time t = 2.
The private sector of the economy is composed of a continuum of mass 1 of identical
agents whose utility is given by
U = c0 + c1 + c2;
where ct  0 is private consumption at time t.
These agents play a dual role as \bankers" and households. For simplicity we do not
model banks explicitly as independent deposit-taking institutions, since \bank fragility"
caused by bank runs  a la Diamond and Dybvig (1983) plays no role in our model. The
17banking sector only serves the role of reallocating savings from banks without investment
opportunities to banks with investment opportunities. This reallocation takes place in the
form of interbank loans collateralized by government debt. Our model thus captures in a
simple way one important channel through which the value of government debt can aect
the banking sector and real activity.11
The budget constraints of the government and private sector are summarized in Table 2.
Income (or output) in period t is denoted by yt. The government nances a xed level g of
expenditures on public goods in period 0 by issuing debt that is repaid in the last period. This
debt is purchased by banks, who then can use their government debt securities as collateral
to borrow in the interbank market. The government's and individual household-bankers'
budget constraints in period 0 are given by respectively:
g = p0b
and
c0 + p0b = y0;
where:
1. y0 is the exogenously given initial level of output,
2. b is the level of debt the government must repay at t = 2, and
3. p0 is the price of government debt at t = 0.
Bankers are identical in period 0 but are divided into two groups from period 1 onwards,
with respective mass ! and (1 !). The rst group ! 2 [0;1] of bankers obtain an investment
opportunity in period 1, which yields a return I +f(I) at t = 2, for an investment I at time
11As mentioned in the introduction, one can think of other channels that do not involve the role of
government debt as collateral in the interbank market. The assumption that matters for our analysis, in
reduced form, is that a fall in the price of government debt negatively aect the banking sector and real
activity.
181. We assume that the surplus from the investment f(I) is a concave function of I and
reaches its maximum at I = I. The maximum amount, I, that an individual banker can
invest in is given by his endowment y1 plus the (collateralized) loans d the banker is able to
get from the second group (1 !) of bankers, who do not obtain an investment opportunity
in period 1.
The size of interbank loans, in turn, is limited by the value of collateral (government
bonds) held by bankers. Let   1 denote the size of an interbank loan per dollar of
collateral. To the extent that  > 1, each dollar of government bond brings more than one
dollar of interbank lending. Part of the benet of government debt then is to bring about
more credit between private agents ("nancial development"). We assume that collateral
in an interbank loan must be held to maturity, and each banker can borrow a maximum
collateralized amount d  p1b, so that the maximum he can invest is I = y1 + p1b.12 Any
individual banker with an investment opportunity can borrow the maximum amount p1b
from the other bankers, provided that the aggregate demand for collateralized interbank
loans from the rst group of bankers, !d = !p1b, does not exceed the total available supply
of liquidity from the second group of bankers, which is given by their total endowment at
time 1, y1(1   !).13 So that, the following condition must hold for bankers with investment
opportunities to be able to borrow the maximum collateralizable amount p1b:
!d = !p1b  y1(1   !):
We assume that this condition holds in the remainder of our analysis.
Bankers without investment opportunities can trade bonds among themselves. We denote
by b0 the end-of-period holdings of bonds by the representative banker without investment
12We could assume that banks with investment opportunities can purchase government bonds in the
secondary market so as to increase their collateralized borrowing capacity. However, the analysis becomes
more involved, without adding major new insights. For simplicity, therefore, we do not allow banks to
collateralize loans with government bonds that are purchased in the secondary market in period 1.
13Recall that we have assumed that consumption at any date must be non-negative, ct  0, so that the
maximum amount any banker can lend in period 1 is y1.
19opportunity. In a symmetric equilibrium (in which all bankers of a given type behave in the
same way), there is no trade of bonds among bankers so that b0 = b, but the existence of
this market pins down the price of bonds, p1.






t = 0 c0 = y0   p0b g = p0b
t = 1 c1 = y1   I + d with d  p1b c1 = y1   !
1 !d
t = 2 c2 = I + f(I)   d + b   T c2 = !
1 !d + b   T b = T
We introduce a government debt risk in the model by assuming that the government may
not repay its debt in period 2. We assume that in period 1, the private sector receives a signal
about the probability that the government will repay or default in t = 2. This signal aects
the market price of government debt and so its value as collateral. For simplicity, we assume
that the period-1 signal is perfectly informative|i.e., the private sector learns in period 1
whether the government will default in period 2|and that the government repays nothing
if it defaults. (These assumptions could be relaxed without aecting the main insights.)
Viewed from period 0, the probability that the government will default is denoted by ,
a measure of the ex ante default risk. In the budget constraints the government's action is
represented by a variable  that is equal to 1 if the government repays and to 0 if it defaults.
For now, and for the sake of simplicity, we do not model the underlying determinants of the
government's repayment and take the default risk as exogenous. Government default will be
endogenized in section 6.
We now review the timeline of events by proceeding backwards and deriving at the same
time the equilibrium conditions for a (competitive) Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE).
Timing:
20In period 2, investment yields its payo I + f(I); the bankers who borrowed in the
interbank market must repay d out of nal output I + f(I), and the government repays its
debt (if it does) by levying a lump-sum tax T = b on the bankers. Period-2 consumption





for the bankers with no investment opportunities (given that interbank loans are riskless)
and by
c2 = I   d + f(I);
for the bankers with an investment opportunity.14
In period 1, the private sector learns whether the government will repay its debt or
not (variable ). Government debt is then traded between the bankers without investment
opportunity at an equilibrium price of
p1 = :
Bankers with an investment opportunity invest the optimal level I if they can. We assume
that:
!I
 < y1 < I
:
This condition ensures that aggregate demand for collateralized interbank loans does not
exceed the total supply of liquidity in the economy, but that the bankers cannot nance
the ecient level of investment without borrowing. Investment is equal to the ecient level
unless it is constrained by collateral value, that is
I = min(I
;y1 + p1b):
14The government repays its debt b in period 2, but at the same time levies a tax T to repay its debt.
This is why b does not appear (in the aggregate) in period 2 consumption.
21In period 0, the government borrows p0b from households and uses the proceeds to fund
public goods g. Households then mechanically consume g and c0 = y0   p0b.
We conclude this section by deriving some properties of the equilibrium that will be
useful to understand the case with two countries. We begin by deriving an expression for the
welfare of the representative banker in period 0 when the government issues a xed amount
of bonds b. In period 0 consumption is c0 = y0   p0b, and the government bond entitles
the representative banker to a future consumption of b. However, with probability  the
government defaults and the bond is worthless. In addition, when the government does not
default, it must levy a (lump-sum) tax of T in period 2 to nance the repayment b, so that
the net future expected consumption out of the government is only (1   )(b   T).
As for private consumption in subsequent dates, its level depends on whether the repre-
sentative banker belongs to the rst group (with investment opportunities) in period 1 or to
the second group (without investment opportunities).
Bankers in the rst group invest their entire endowment y1 in period 1 and borrow
d  p1b from the second group. Thus these bankers don't consume at all in period 1 and
postpone their consumption to period 2, when their investment pays o. In the last period










With probability 1 , there is no default and the price of government debt in period 1 is p1 =
1. Bankers with investment opportunities can then borrow d  b, produce a total output
of min(I;y1 + d) + f(min(I;y1 + d)), and therefore consume c2 = y1 + f(min(I;y1 + d)).
With probability , there is a default and the price of government debt in period 1 is then
p1 = 0. Bankers with investment opportunities can therefore not borrow in the interbank
market and invest only y1. Their output (and consumption) in period 2 is then y1 + f(y1).
Bankers in the second group do not generate any surplus and simply consume their period
221 endowment y1. Therefore, the ex-ante expected utility of a representative banker is given
by:15
U = y0   p0b + y1 + (1   )[b   T + !f(min(I
;y1 + b))] + !f(y1):
Next, from the rst-order condition for the demand for government bonds, @U=@b = 0,
we observe that:
p0 = (1   )[1 + !f
0(y1 + b)
+]; (1)
where we use the standard notation x+ = max(0;x).16 In other words, the equilibrium
price of government bonds at t = 0 is equal to the probability of repayment times a factor
re
ecting the extra value of bonds as collateral (the "collateral premium"). The collateral
premium is decreasing with the quantity of bonds that can be used as collateral and falls to






If b  b banks with an investment opportunity hold more government debt than they
need to nance the ecient level of investment if there is no government default and the
collateral premium is then equal to zero. Equation (1) implicitly denes the banks' demand
for government debt, which is decreasing with its price.
The equilibrium price p0 results from the equality between supply and demand in the
market for government bonds, b = g=p0. Using equation (1) the condition for market equi-
librium can therefore be written as,
(1   )P(b)b = g; (2)
15Note that this expression does not include the utility from the public expenditure g. Adding a constant
term would obviously not change any of the results, so that we simply normalize the utility from the public
expenditure to zero.
16We have @f(min(I;y1 + b))=@b = f0(y1 + b)+ since the marginal net return f0(I) is positive for I
smaller than I and equal to zero for I = I.
23where P(b)  1+!f0(y1 +b)+ is the inverse of the demand function for government debt
when the probability of default is equal to zero. We assume that P(b)b is increasing with b,
that is, the government does not decrease its resources by issuing more debt. This ensures
that the market for government bonds has a unique equilibrium in period 0.17
The market equilibrium condition (2) reveals that the number of bonds that the govern-
ment must issue, b, is increasing with the level of public expenditure, g, and the probability






the government must issue an amount of bonds that is larger than b, implying that there
is no collateral premium (and that the equilibrium amount of bonds is b = g=(1   ) > b).
That the banking sector is not constrained by a structural shortage of public debt seems a
natural assumption to make in our context.18
To summarize, the government is assumed to default with probability  in period 0.
Default in period 2 can be perfectly anticipated in period 1, so that the price of government
bonds in period 1, p1, drops to the recovery value of the debt whenever default is anticipated.
For simplicity we assume the recovery value  to be zero, so that p1 = 0 when default is
anticipated.19 Moreover, when default is expected, bankers with an investment opportunity
are unable to borrow in the interbank market and can only invest their endowment in the
investment project: I = y1. As a result an impending debt default hurts the banking sector
and aggregate investment. Note that this highly stylized model is consistent with a scenario
17This is not necessarily true because P(b) is decreasing with b. One could imagine a situation in which
the government can levy a given level of funds by issuing a large amount of bonds at a low price or a smaller
amount of bonds at a higher price. This possibility does not complicate the analysis in an interesting way
and we rule it out in the following.
18When the US government debt was shrinking in the late 1990s, some economists expressed the concern
that it might ultimately become insucient for the nancial system to operate eciently. This is clearly no
longer an issue.
19The analysis can be straightforwardly generalized to allow for a positive recovery value 0   < b, and
a positive price p1 =  in period 1 in the event of default. As no substantive new insight is obtained from
this more general model we assume for simplicity that  = 0.
24where a government debt crisis spills over into a banking crisis, as in Argentina. It may
also be consitent with a scenario where a banking crisis spills over into a debt crisis, as in
Iceland.20
4 Two countries
We now consider two countries that are nancially integrated, in the sense that banks can
buy the government debt of both countries in a single frictionless market, but not scally
integrated, as each country's government determines its scal policy independently. We are
interested in the implications of nancial integration for the investment decisions of banks
and for nancial contagion between the two countries.
We begin again by taking the default risk in each country as given (this will be endog-
enized in the next section). For simplicity, we assume that the government default risk is
equal to zero in one country (the safe country S) and that it is positive and equal to  in
the other country (the risky country R). This means that the price of government debt of
the safe country in period 1 is always equal to one (pS1 = 1), while the price of the risky
country government debt is such that:
pR1 =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
1 with probability 1   ;
0 with probability :
In all other respects the two countries are identical: they have the same level g of ex-
penditures on public goods in period 0, the same economies with a continuum of mass 1 of
20Admittedly, under the latter scenario, the timing of the model would have to be changed as follows.
In period 1, bankers with investment opportunities would invest in two stages: rst, they invest their
endowment y1, and subsequently they would learn whether their investment pays o or not. If it pays o
(with probability (1  )) the government has enough scal revenues to be able to service its debt, in which
case p1 = b and bankers can in a second step expand their investment opportunity by borrowing d = b. If
it does not pay o (with probability ) the government does not get enough tax revenues in period 2 to be
able to repay its debt. The banking `crisis' then triggers a debt crisis.
25identical agents with utility function U = c0 + c1 + c2, the same endowments y0 and y1, and
the same investment opportunities f(:) open to the same mass ! of group 1 bankers with
investment opportunities.
4.1 Equilibrium under Integration
We rst derive the bankers' demand for government bonds. In each country a banker is faced
with a portfolio choice problem fbijg in period 0 of how much of each government's debts
to hold, where i = S;R denotes the banker's country of residence and j = S;R the issuing
country.
Bankers choose their bond portfolios so as to maximize their expected welfare, which
like before is determined by the probabilities of having an investment opportunity and/or a
government default. In the safe country the optimal portfolio for a banker maximizes the
banker's period-0 welfare:
US = y0   pS0bSS   pR0bSR + y1 + (1   )[bSS + bSR   TS + !f (min(I
;y1 + (bSS + bSR))]
+ [bSS   TS + !f (min(I
;y1 + bSS)]; (4)
and in the risky country the optimal portfolio for a banker maximizes:
UR = y0   pS0bRS   pR0bRR + y1 + (1   )[bRS + bRR   TR + !f (min(I
;y1 + (bRS + bRR))]
+ [bRS + !f (min(I
;y1 + bRS)]: (5)
The demand for bonds is determined by the four rst-order conditions @US=@bSS =
@US=@bSR = @UR=@bRS = @U=@bRR = 0. One can see that the rst-order conditions are the
same for the banks of the safe country as for those of the risky country. This is not surprising,
as what dierentiates the two countries is sovereign default risk, not the bankers' objectives
or constraints. Thus, in a symmetric equilibrium|in which all bankers of the same type and
26of the same country behave the same|the portfolio allocations in each country (given by
the rst-order conditions) will be the same.21 The banking system of a given country then
holds one half of the domestic government's debt and one half of the foreign government's
debt in a symmetric equilibrium. As can be seen from the rst-order conditions, banks are
induced to diversify their portfolio risk by the concavity in the return function f(I).
We denote by bS and bR respectively the holdings of safe debt and risky debt of the
representative banker. The demand for the two types of debt is characterized by the rst-
order conditions
pS0 = (1   )

1 + !f









pR0 = (1   )

1 + !f
0(y1 + (bS + bR))
+
: (7)
Like before, the price of debt includes a collateral premium, which now re
ects the
quantities of both debts in banks' portfolios. The equilibrium price and quantities in the
period-0 market for government debt can then be determined by using the two equations for
supply
2pS0bS = g; (8)
and
2pR0bR = g; (9)
(with a factor 2 as the debt is purchased in equal amounts by the bankers from the two
countries). The equilibrium of the government debt market is characterized by a quadruplet
of quantities and prices, (bS;bR;pS0;pR0), that satises equations (6), (7), (8) and (9). The
main properties of the equilibrium are summarized in the following proposition.
21To be precise, the allocation of the debt without collateral premium is indeterminate. We pin it down by
restricting attention to symmetric equilibria, where all bankers choose the same portfolio allocation unless
they have a strict reason not to do so. The allocation of the debt with a collateral premium is uniquely
determined.
27Proposition 1 Assume b < g < 2b. Then nancial integration is associated with (i)
portfolio diversication, (ii) nancial contagion and (iii) improved welfare in both countries:
(i) portfolio diversication: in period 0, the banks of both countries hold the same portfolio
of safe and risky government debt;
(ii) nancial contagion: in period 1, a government default in the risky country lowers
investment and output equally in both countries;
(iii) welfare: ex ante welfare is higher than under autarky in both countries.
Proof. See appendix.
Portfolio diversication, as we saw above, results from the bankers' desire to insure against
sovereign risk. Financial contagion is then a natural consequence of portfolio diversication|
a default by the risky country aects the banks of both countries. The condition b < g < 2b
implies that investment is equal to the ecient level if there is no default (i.e., there is no
structural shortage of government debt), but that banks start to be collateral-constrained if
one country defaults. The prices of government debt in period 0 are given by
pS0 = 1 + !f
0(y1 + bS); (10)
and
pR0 = 1   : (11)
The premium in the price of safe government debt re
ects the fact that it becomes a scarce
collateral if the risky country defaults. By contrast, the price of risky debt does not have a
premium because collateral is not scarce when there is no default.
One can easily understand that the banks of the risky country benet from nancial
integration, which gives them access to a safe collateral. Perhaps more surprisingly, the
safe country also gains from nancial integration in spite of the fact that this exposes its
banking system to nancial contagion, and makes its output both more volatile and lower in
28expected value than under autarky. The reason is that the safe country sells its government
debt at a high price that re
ects the value of insurance for foreign banks. Using (8) and
(9), y1 + bS < I < y1 + (bS + bR) as well as TS = 2bS and TR = 2bR to substitute out
TS and TR and equation (11) to substitute out pR0 from (4) and (5) we obtain the following
expressions for welfare:
US = y0 + y1   g + ! [(1   )f(I
) + f(y1 + bS)] + (pS0   1)bS; (12)
and
UR = y0 + y1   g + ! [(1   )f(I
) + f(y1 + bS)]   (pS0   1)bS: (13)
In words, the welfare of the safe country is equal to: i) the value of initial endowments net of
the public expenditure, y0+y1 g, plus ii) expected period 2 output, ! [(1   )f(I) + f(y1 + bS)],
plus iii) the prot made from selling domestic government debt at a high price to the other
country's banks, (pS0   1)bS. The welfare of the risky country is the same, except that the
premium it pays on safe debt enters as a cost instead of a prot. The safe country gains
from nancial integration because of the collateral premium that is paid by foreign banks on
the safe government debt. The safe country, in other words, is fairly compensated through
the market price of its debt for the insurance that it provides to the risky country.
To summarize, under nancial integration bankers in the risky country compete with
bankers in the safe country for safe-country debt. In the process, they eectively export
sovereign risk to the safe country. While under autarky, safe-country bankers would have
held only safe debt, under nancial integration they may be driven to diversify and hold
both safe and risky debt. As a result, when the risky country defaults on its debts it
exports the crisis to the safe country by restricting the amount of collateralized borrowing
that the safe country's banks can undertake. On the other hand, the bankers of the risky
country benet from holding safe country debt as this reduces their government domestic
debt risk. Moreover, they are willing to pay a premium for holding this debt, which amounts
29to a transfer from the risky country to the safe country. Financial integration generates
important risk diversication benets ex ante, but at the cost of contagion ex post. On
balance, the welfare gains are positive for both countries.
4.2 Endogenous supply of collateral
A natural question to ask, at this juncture, is what amount of insurance the safe country will
nd it optimal to provide to the risky country. Under the assumption that we have made
so far, each government issues just enough debt to nance g so that the level of debt is not
a choice variable. We now relax this restriction by assuming that governments can do open
market operations by which they issue their own debt in order to buy the debt of the other
government. In this way, the scally safe government can increase the supply of safe debt
and reduce the supply of risky debt to the banking sector of both countries.22
More formally, we now write the bond market equilibrium equations in period 0 as:
pS0BS = 2pS0bS + (pR0BR   g);
and
pR0BR = 2pR0bR + (pS0BS   g);
where BS and BR are the supplies of government bonds by respectively the safe and risky
countries. By issuing a total amount of debt Bj the government of country j can raise
revenues pj0Bj, which it can use to fund the public good expenditure g and, to the extent that
it raises more than g, to purchase government bonds from the other country's government.
The left-hand side of these equations is the total supply of bonds, and the right-hand side
is the sum of the demands from bankers (rst term) and from the other government (the
22This is one interpretation of what the European Financial Stabilization Fund was created to do (buy
risky government debt by issuing debt that is guaranteed by the scally safe governments).
30second term). Adding up these equations implies that
pS0bS + pR0bR = g;
that is, the representative banker must hold the amount of debt that is necessary to nance
the expenditure g.
The scally risky government will never nd it optimal to increase the relative supply of
risky debt (which hurts its own bankers without benet to anybody else), so that we can
assume pR0BR = g. The question is whether the safe government may nd it optimal to
increase the supply of its debt by setting pS0BS > g. The answer can be found by looking at
the variation of the safe country's welfare with respect to its supply of bonds.23 Using (10)




0(y1 + bS) + ![f
0(y1 + bS) + f
00(y1 + bS)bS]
= ![2f
0(y1 + bS) + f
00(y1 + bS)bS]:
The safe country's welfare is thus maximized for a level of bond supply b
S that satises the
rst-order condition:
f





Since f00(:) < 0 we observe that at the optimum b
S for the safe country government we have
f0(y1 + b
S) > 0.
The supply of safe government bonds is lower than the level that would be chosen by a
\federalist social planner" maximizing the sum of the payos in the risky and safe countries
23Note that we assume that the level of safe government debt can be increased without making it more
risky. That is, we are considering debt increases that are not large enough to endanger the solvency of the
government in the safe country.
31given below:
US + UR = 2[y0 + y1   g + !((1   )f(I
) + f(y1 + bS)]:




0(y1 + bS) = 0;
which requires that bS be set at b. The social planner increases the supply of safe debt to
a level such that banks are not constrained even if there is a default in the risky country.
In sum, nancial integration results in an inecient supply of safe collateral. In our
illustration with only one safe government and one risky government, the safe country gov-
ernment acts like a monopoly issuer and rations the amount of safe debt available, so as to
be able to extract a collateral scarcity premium from the bankers in the risky country. Our
results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Assume that the scally safe government may increase the relative supply of
safe bonds through open market operations. Then the safe government will keep the supply
of safe bonds ineciently low from the point of view of the two countries' welfare.
Proof. See discussion above.
Figure 5 presents a numerical illustration of our results. To construct the gure we









and set the model parameters to the following values: y0 = y1 = g = 1, ! = 0:2,  = 0:2,
 = 5 and I = 5. We observe that the safe country maximizes its own welfare by limiting
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Figure 5: Variation of welfare in the safe and risky countries with the supply of safe debt
welfare are maximized by setting bS above 0:8.
5 Fiscal integration
We have assumed so far that the default of the risky country, and its consequences on the
banking system of both countries, were exogenous events that could not be remedied. We
now introduce into the model the possibility for the risky country to restore its solvency
either through a scal adjustment or a bailout from the safe country. Ex post, the safe
country may be ready to contribute to a bailout to the extent that it improves the situation
of its own banks. Successfully restoring the solvency of the risky government, thus, may
involve a combination of scal eort and transfer|in other words, a certain degree of scal
integration. Such an arrangement, if it prevents the default of the risky country and the
resulting drop in investment, will increase total welfare to the rst-best (no-default) level.
The key question, however, is whether it is possible to design the arrangement in such a way
that both countries benet ex ante.
We expand our basic model by adding the possibility of a scal adjustment in period
331.24 The scal adjustment and bailout mechanism can be characterized, in reduced form,
by an allocation of a scal eort between the two countries. In order to avoid a default,
the repayment on each bond of the risky country government must be increased from 0 to
1.25 We denote by  the fraction of the repayment that comes from the risky country's own
resources, the residual (1   ) being nanced by a transfer (bailout) from the safe country.
Parameter  captures the weight that is put by the mechanism on the defaulting country's
own scal eort as opposed to external help|or, in other words,  is a measure of the
mechanism's reliance on discipline rather than insurance via transfers.
The reduced-form parameter  is sucient to determine the welfare of both countries (ex
ante and ex post). However, it is interesting to ask how the value of  may be determined
by the rules that govern the scal integration between the two countries. Consider rst the
case of discretion, that is, the case where the two governments negotiate ex post (in period
1) the allocation of the scal eort between the two countries. Avoiding a default ex post
increases output by the same amount, ! [f(I)   f(y1 + bS)], in both countries. It follows
that the welfare gain from the scal adjustment is also the same in both countries if they
share the cost equally ( = 1=2). In this case, the safe country simply provides a bailout of
bR to the risky country, with half of this transfer coming back to the safe-country banks in
the form of a repayment of their claims on the risky country government.
In general, the transfer from the safe country to the risky country depends on the relative
bargaining power of the two countries. For example, assume that the safe country has all the
bargaining power and can make a take-it-or-leave-it oer to the risky country. Then there
are two cases to consider. If the output gain from the adjustment is larger than the cost of
24We assume that this commitment is possible one period ahead, in t = 1 but not in t = 0. If the risky
country could commit to the scal adjustment in period 0, it would always do so and there would be no
crisis.
25Without much loss of generality, we restrict attention to mechanisms that prevent default completely
rather than merely increase the debt recovery value in a partial default. Also, our model is too spared down
to allow for a meaningful distinction between a sovereign bailout and a bank rescue (see Philippon, 2009, for
an analysis of bank recapitalization in an open economy).
34repaying foreign banks for the risky country,
! [f(I
)   f(y1 + bS)] > bR; (14)
then the risky country is ready to make the adjustment without external help. The safe
country then indeed does not oer any help in equilibrium ( = 1), and there would never
be a default in equilibrium because the risky country would always nd it optimal to do a
scal adjustment in period 1.
The more interesting case is when condition (14) is not met, so that the risky country
does not implement the scal adjustment without external help. Using the fact that if the
mechanism is successful there is no default, so that bS = bR = g=2, we note that condition












This condition says that the benet of the scal adjustment in terms of increased output (the
r.h.s.) is smaller than the payment of the debt to the safe country's banks (the l.h.s.). Note
that in this case, the risky country does not implement the scal adjustment (in the absence
of external transfer) because of international nancial integration. Under autarky, the risky
country would implement the scal adjustment because it would capture all the benets of
the adjustment in terms of higher output. Under nancial integration, by contrast, those
benets are divided between the two countries whereas the taxpayer of the risky country
bears the entire burden of the adjustment.
Subject to condition (15), the adjustment can take place only if it is supported by a
transfer from the safe country. The risky country's share of the burden of adjustment cannot
exceed a bound given by,
   
! [f(I)   f(y1 + g=2)]
g=2
:
35Thus, even if the safe country has all the bargaining power ex post, it must make a transfer
to the risky country in order to induce the scal adjustment.
We have assumed so far that the countries do not relinquish any scal sovereignty, so
that the best that they can do is bargain over the welfare gains from a scal adjustment ex
post. A deeper form of scal integration would be a federalist system allowing the countries
to commit ex ante to the value of . As an example of scal federalism, the risky country
could accept ex ante to let the safe country take over its scal policy in the event of default.
In this case, the safe country will make sure that the risky country bears all the burden of
the adjustment ex post ( = 1).
How does scal integration aect welfare ex ante (in period 0)? The welfare of the two
countries can be written
US = y0 + y1   g + !f(I
)   (1   )g;
UR = y0 + y1   g + !f(I
) + (1   )g:
Thus, the welfare of the safe country is equal to expected output net of public expenditures
minus the expected transfer to the risky country. The welfare of the risky country involves
the same terms except that the transfer is counted positively.
The welfare of the safe country is obviously maximized when the scal adjustment mech-
anism puts all the weight on discipline rather than insurance ( = 1). Even in this case,
however, the safe country's welfare is the same as under autarky, and it is strictly lower than
the welfare level that the safe country would obtain in the absence of a scal adjustment
mechanism (this is an implication of point (iii) of Proposition 1). Thus we have the following
result.
Proposition 3 Conditional on nancial integration, the safe country always loses ex ante
from scal integration. The safe country is strictly worse o with nancial plus scal inte-
gration than under autarky, except in the limit case where the scal adjustment mechanism
36involves no transfer (in which case the safe country is indierent between autarky and inte-
gration).
Proof. See discussion above.
The incentives of the safe country to reduce the risk of default in the other country are
very dierent ex ante and ex post. Ex post (in period 1) the safe country looses output
and welfare from a default in the risky country, and is ready to contribute some resources
to avoid this outcome. Ex ante, however, the safe country benets from the riskiness of the
other country's government debt because it extracts a monopoly rent from issuing the safe
haven asset. Thus, the safe country increases its welfare ex ante by committing not to help
the risky country resolve its default.
The safe country's ex ante commitment not to help, however, may not be credible since
it benets from helping the risky country ex post.26 If commitment is not possible, the next
best solution for the safe country is to ensure that the default-avoiding mechanism relies as
much as possible on discipline rather than transfers (i.e., maximizes ). If transfers cannot
be completely ruled out (i.e.,  is smaller than 1), the safe country is worse o ex ante in
the equilibrium with nancial plus scal integration than it would be under autarky. This
means that the safe country is strictly better o not participating in the union, except in
the extreme case where the scal adjustment mechanism relies entirely on discipline and
involves no international transfer ( = 1). Even in this extreme case, the welfare of the safe
country is not higher than under autarky. Thus, it seems very dicult to nd a form of scal
integration that satises the ex ante participation constraint of the safe country, unless the
risky country compensates the safe country ex ante for its insurance services.
Our results are illustrated in Figure 6. This gure reports the welfare of the safe coun-
tries under three scenarios: under autarky, nancial integration, and nancial plus scal
integration. The gure is constructed by assuming that the two countries bargain ex post
26Note that in this model, commitment reduces total welfare. The sum of the welfare of the two countries
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Figure 6: Welfare of the safe country under autarky, nancial integration and nancial plus
scal integration
over the scal adjustment and have the same bargaining power ( = 1=2), while otherwise
using the same parameter values as for Figure 5. As Figure 6 illustrates, the welfare of the
safe country is increased by nancial integration as the output cost of nancial contagion is
more than oset by the rent from providing the safe haven asset to the risky country. Once
scal integration is introduced, however, the safe country not only looses the safe haven rent
but must also pay a transfer to the risky country when there is a crisis, so that its welfare
falls below the autarky level. Thus, the model explains why Germany, as the provider of
the safe government debt for the Euro area, might suer from scal integration while at the
same time beneting from nancial integration. It also explains why Germany has a strong
interest in developing a form of scal integration that puts as much emphasis as possible on
discipline rather than transfers.
6 Productivity shocks
In this section we present an extension of the model in which a default results explicitly
from a negative productivity shock. This will show how the model with exogenous default
that we have used so far can be viewed as a reduced form for a model in which default is
38the result of real shocks. This will also bring out new properties, in particular self-fullling
crises and \government debt contagion" that may capture real world phenomena.
Consider again the model with a single country, where we have assumed that the gov-
ernment defaults with probability . To illustrate this default event more explicitly we now
augment the model by adding a stochastic shock to period 2 output. Thus, we shall assume
that net output f(I) is aected by a multiplicative shock , which can take two values:
 2 fL;Hg, where 0 < L < H and where the probability that  = L is . We suppose
that the government's scal receipts in period 2 are given by,
!f(I);
where  is the tax rate and net output !f(I) is the tax base.27 If in period 2 the scal
receipts are lower than the debt coming due,
b > !f(I);
then there is a default in which the government repays nothing. We assume that  is observed
in period 1.
The one-country model that we have presented in section 3 is a reduced form of this
model if we assume,
!Lf(I
) < g < (1   )!Hf(I
): (16)
The optimal level of investment remains I because the productivity shock multiplies net
output f(I). If !Lf(I) < g, the government does not have enough scal resources to
repay its debt if productivity is low (since b  g and I  I). The condition g=(1   ) =
b < !Hf(I) ensures that the government can repay its debt if productivity is high.
One new feature of the equilibrium is the possibility of a self-fullling crisis. Assume that
27We could assume that the tax base is gross output !(I+f(I)) without changing the qualtitative results.
39we have
g > (1   )!Hf(y1);
(which can be satised at the same time as (16)). Then a self-fullling default could occur
even if productivity is high. The expectation of a default is self-fullling because it restricts
the banks' collateral constraint, investment in period 1 and the tax base in period 2. The
appropriate solution could be lending-of-last-resort that pegs the price of government debt
at the good equilibrium level.28
In the two-country model, we can assume that the dierence between the safe country
and the risky country is that the former has a high level of productivity with probability
1.29 Then there is an equilibrium in which the safe country never defaults if
bS < !Hf(y1 + bS):
The safe country must have enough resources to repay its debt even when those resources are
reduced by a default in the risky country. We have implicitly assumed that this condition
was satised in the model of section 4. If this condition is not satised, however, a negative
productivity shock in the risky country triggers a government default in both countries. There
is international contagion not only in the banking system but also in government debt. The
debt of the safe country is no longer a safe haven asset and the safe country unambiguously
loses from international nancial integration (whereas the risky country does not gain from
it).
28This type of lending-in-last resort can be implemented by a limited fund such as the EFSF or by central
banks.
29Alternatively, one could assume that the safe country has a higher level of , so that it does not default
even if productivity is low.
407 Conclusion
We have provided a rst analysis of contagion of sovereign debt crises through an integrated
banking system. At the same time, we have examined how a sovereign debt crisis in one
country may be resolved by a combination of bailouts by the other countries in a union and
scal adjustment in the distressed country. We have also highlighted the benets and costs
of joining a nancially, but not scally, integrated union. Our framework, with one risky
and one safe country, is simple enough to draw attention to some key results, but of course,
too special to capture all the complexities of a crisis such as the one currently unfolding in
the Euro zone. A rst obvious observation is that the incentives of banks in an integrated
nancial system to diversify their portfolios of sovereign debt, while reducing the cost of
a default for any individual nancial institution, also gives rise to a risk of contagion. A
second, somewhat less obvious observation is that in equilibrium the safe member country
supplies too little \safe haven" debt, while the risky country may supply too much risky debt.
Third, nancial integration leads banks to diversify their debt portfolios, and thereby create
hostages in the safe country, which can be used to extract bailouts by the risky country, as
we have seen in the Greek and Irish crises. Fourth, the possibility of contagious sovereign
debt crises and bailouts may substantially reduce the benets of joining a monetary union.
Indeed, we have shown that the benets of economic integration are unevenly distributed
across member-countries, and that the prospect of bailouts may eliminate the benets of
integration for the safe country.
Many important issues remain to be explored, such as the vexing question of how an
optimal stabilization mechanism should be designed, and how much scal integration is
desirable to maximize the benets of nancial integration. Other interesting issues, which
probably require a richer model to be analyzed, are the optimal form of regulation of banks
in a nancially integrated union, and the optimal form of coordinated intervention through
bank rescues and sovereign debt bailouts. We leave these important topics for future research.
41APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1
Based on the discussion preceding the Proposition, the only result that remains to be
shown, to prove points (i) and (ii) of the Proposition, is that if b < g < 2b we have
bS < b
 < bS + bR;
so that the banking sector is constrained if and only if the risky government defaults. Using
(6) and (7) the market equilibrium conditions (8) and (9) can be written









where function P() was dened at the end of section 3. Adding up those two equations
gives
(1   )P(bS + bR)(bS + bR) + P(bS)bS = g:
One cannot have bS + bR < b. Since P(b)b is increasing in b this would imply






which cannot be true because g is assumed to be larger than b (equation (3)). It follows
that P(bS + bR) = 1 and the budget constraint for the safe country is




The l.h.s. is increasing with bS and for bS = b it is equal to [1    + P(b)]b = b, which
42is larger than g=2 by assumption. So the equilibrium level of bS must be smaller than b.
As for point (iii) of the Proposition, we write the welfare levels under autarky as
US = y0 + y1   g + !f(I
);
UR = y0 + y1   g + ! [(1   )f(I
) + f(y1)]:
Using expressions (12) and (13) for the welfare levels of the two countries under integration,
and expression (10) to substitute out pS0, we nd that the welfare gains from nancial
integration for the safe and risky countries are respectively
US = ! [f(y1 + bS) + f
0(y1 + bS)bS   f(I
)] > 0;
UR = ! [f(y1 + bS)   f(y1)   f
0(y1 + bS)bS] > 0;
where the positive sign results from the concavity of f() and, for US, from y1 +2bs > I.
QED
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